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IS A CRIMINAL ASSAULT A SEPARATE SUBSTANTIVE
CRIME OR IS IT AN ATTEMPTED BATTERY?
An examination of the criminal assault cases which have
been de.ided during the last two hundred years discloses the
fact that the courts have used two fundamentally different
theories in definin the offense. Different results have been
reached in describing and punishing the same offense, depend-
hg largely upon whether the courts have looked upon the of-
fene as a separate substantive crime1 or whether they have
lodced upon it as an attempted battery.2 There is little indica-
tio that the courts have carefully thought it out one way or
the other.
A simple civil assault is generally defined as any unlawful
offer or attempt coupled with an apparent present ability to
injure the person of another, and the act must be such that it
,reates a reasonable apprehension of imminent peril in the mind
of the assaulted person. " If the assaulted person is put in rea-
sonable apprehension of bodily harm, there need be only ap-
parent present ability on the part of the actor to carry out his
threat. 4 The key words here are apparent, present, and appre-
'Some few courts make it a separate substantive crime, the
elements of which set it apart and stand it upon its own base inde-
pendent of the offense entitled a criminal battery. Price v. U. S., 156
Fed. 950 (C. C. A. 9th, 1907); State v. Hamburg, 4 W. W. Harr. 62,
143 Atl. 47 (Ct. Gen. Sess., Del. 1928); State v. Shepard, 10 Iowa
126 (1859); Commonwealth v. White, 110 Mass. 407 (1872); State v.
Barry, 45 Mont. 598, 124 Pac. 775 (1912); State v. Cherry, 11 Ired.
475, 33 N. C. 336 (1850); People v. Tremaine, 129 Misc. 650, 222
N. Y. S. 432 (1927); Clark v. State, 106 Pac. 803 (Okla., 1910); State
v. Baker, 20 R. I. 275, 38 Atl. 653 (1897); Burgess v. Commonwealth,
136 Va. 697, 118 S. E. 273 (1923); State v. Rush, 127 P. (2d) 411
(Wash., 1942).
-' In numerous ways the great majority of the courts closely tie it
up with a criminal battery by defining it, broadly speaking, as an
attempt to commit a battery. Brown v. State, 57 Ga. App. 864, 197
S. E. 82 (1938); State v. Roby, 194 Iowa 1032, 188 N. W. 709 (1922);
State v. Linville, 150 Kan. 617, 95 P. (2d) 332 (1939); State v. Aleck,
41 La. Ann. 83, 5 So. 639 (1889); Commonwealth v. McCan, 277
Mass. 199, 178 N. E. 633 (1931); State v. Martinez, 30 N. M. 178, 230
Pac. 379 (1924); Perez v. State, 114 Tex. Cr. R. 473, 22 S. W. (2d)
309 (1929).
'PROSSER, TORTS (1941) sec. 10; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934)
see. 21.
' Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hill, 25 Ala. App. 540, 150 So.
709 (1933); Beach v. Hancock, 27 N. H. 223, 59 Am. Dec. 373 (1853);
Allen v. Hannaford, 138 Wash. 423, 244 Pac. 700 (1926).
190 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
hension. Mere words are never sufficient,5 and words which
show that the assaulter cannot or does not intend to carry out his
threats will prevent there being an assault.0
The common law apparently followed the tort rule in its
definition of. the criminal assault.7  As Bishop points out, the
stipulation in definitions today that there must be "a present
ability" to carry the threat or offer into effect is not found in
the common law," which required only apparent present ability
on the part of the assaulter. For example, a man could be held
criminally for an assault with an unloaded gun.0
Most states have changed the definition of a criminal as-
sault either by statute or by decision. Many common law rules
have been properly changed in this way. However, in the pres-
ent instance, it would seem that what the statutes and decisions
are calling criminal assaults are, in many instances, attempted
batteries.
The great majority of the courts seem to define a criminal
assault as any unlawful offer or attempt on the part of the as-
saulter, coupled with a present ability, to commit an injury
upon the person of another.' 0  This is similar to the tort of-
fense in that both must be present offenses as opposed to threats
of future harm. It differs chiefly in that there is the require-
ment of an actual ability on the part of the assaulter to carry
out his threat. Some courts hold that the act must be such that
it would constitute a criminal battery if some intervening force
IWestern Union Telegraph Co. v. Hill, 67 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A.
5th, 1933); Gargotto v. Isenberg, 244 Ky. 493, 51 S. W. (2d) 443
(1932); Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N. W. 814 (1926);
Continental Casualty Co. v. Garrett, 161 So. 753 (Miss., 1935). Com-
pare with the criminal law. Roark v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 244,
28 S. E. (2d) 693 (1944).
OBrooker v. Silverthorne, 111 S. C. 553, 99 S. E. 350 (1919);
Turberville v. Savage, 1 Mod. 3 (K. B., 1669). Compare with
criminal assault. People v. Lilley, 43 Mich. 521, 5 N. W. 982 (1880)
(which held that there was no assault if defendant voluntarily
abandoned his purpose before coming into striking distance); State
v. Daniel, 136 N. C. 571, 48 S. E. 544 (1904) (holding bare words are
never sufficient for assault).
72 BisHop, CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 1923) sec. 32(3).
82 BisHop, CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 1923) sec. 32(3). State v.
Shepard, 10 Iowa 126 (1859); State v. Archer, 8 Kan. App. 737, 54
Pac. 927 (1898); Commonwealth v. White, 110 Mass. 407 (1872);
State v. Cherry, 11 Ired. 475, 33 N. C. 336 (1850).
"State v. Shepard, 10 Iowa 126 (1859); State v. Archer, 8 Kan.
App. 737, 54 Pac. 927 (1898).
' See note 2 supra.
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did not prevent the battery from coming into being." Other
courts go so far as to hold that there must be present in the
mind of the assaulter a specific intent to commit some particu-
lar offense.1"-'
These last two requirements, actual ability and specific in-
tent on thc part of the actor, are the same as two of the elements
which are embodied iii the definitions of two other distinct and
separate criminal offenses; namely, criminal attempts and ag-
gravated assaults. This fact raises the problem of whether a
criminal asault is, or should be, a separate offense, or whether
it is. in fact, either an attempt or an aggravated assault. In
order to solve this problem we must have clearly in mind just
what elements constitute the two offenses involved.
An attempt has been defined as "any overt act done with
the intent to commit a crime and which, but for the interference
of some cause preventing the carrying out of the intent, would
have resulted in the commission of the crime. It consists of two
important elements; first, an intent to commit the crime; and
second, a direct ineffectual act done towards its commission."' 2
These two elements are essential to the commission of a criminal
attempt," and they apparently are the same elements that some
courts have embodied in their definitions of a criminal assault.1
It seems, however, that we can distinguish the offense of a
simple criminal ssault from that of an attempted battery. Is
not the person who points an unloaded gun at another with the
intention merely of causing apprehension in the mind of the
x Hulen v. State, 25 Ala. App. 401, 147 So. 450 (1933); cf. People
v. Heise, 217 Calif. 671, 20 P. (2d) 317 (1933) ("battery" is a con-
summated assault); Anderson v. Crawford, 265 Fed. 504 (C. C. A.
8th, 1920) (An assault is an attempt which, if consummated, would
result in a battery).
'-U. S. v. Hand, 26 Fed. Cas. (Case No. 15,297) 103 (C. C., D.
Pa. 1810); People v. Sylva, 143 Calif. 62, 76 Pac. 814 (1904); People
v. Yslas, 27 Calif. 630 (1865); Woodworth v. State, 145 Ind. 276, 43
N. E. 933 (1896); State v. Hefner, 199 N. C. 778, 155 S. E. 879 (1930).
"' AlAY, CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed. 1938) sec. 130; 8 R. C. L. 277;
BALLENTINE, LAW DICTIONARY (1930) p. 122.
" People v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 687, 37 P. (2d) 67 (1934);
People v. Lombard, 131 Cal. App. 525, 21 P. (2d) 955 (1933); Alford
v. Commonwealth, 240 Ky. 513, 42 S. W. (2d) 711 (1931); Common-
wealth v. Crow, 303 Pa. 91, 154 Atl. 283 (1931); Commonwealth v.
Eagan, 190 Pa. 10, 42 Atl. 374 (1899); West v. Commonwealth, 156
Va. 975, 157 S. E. 538 (1931).
" People v. Yslas, 27 Calif. 630 (1865); State v. Lichter,, 7 Boyce
119, 102 Atl. 529 (Ct. of Gen. Sess., Del. 1917); Woodworth v. State,
145 Ind. 276, 43 N. E. 933 (1896).
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other, and who does cause such apprehension, guilty of a crime
that is distinct from the crime which requires specific intent
to do bodily harm to the other as well as a direct ineffectual act
done towards accomplishing that purpose? There is, and
should be, a distinction between these two offenses. The first
is the simple criminal assault as it was known to the common
law, the second is an attempt, a separate substantive crime which
should be punished as an attempted battery.
While some courts and state statutes do not speak of ag'ra-
vated assaults as such, they do speak of what the authorities call
aggravated assaults, under the terms of assault with intent to
kill, rape, rob, et cetera. 16 At common law any assault accom-
panied by aggravating circumstances was considered an agg1ra-
vated assault and was generally punished as a misdemeanor"
It could be made out either by showing specific intent ou the
part of the assaulter or by the use of a deadly weapon.", The
requirement of one or the other of these two elements is con-
tinued in many state statutes today ;19 in other statutes a specific
" The statute definitions of aggravated assaults, while similar in
essential elements, vary greatly in detail. As to the element of speci-
fic intent necessary, see: Note (1944) 32 Ky. L. J. 352. GEN. STAT.
KAN. (1935) 21 sec. 431 (providing for assault with felonious intent
to beat, kill, maim, ravish .... ); GEN. LAWS MASS. (1932) 265 sec.
15 (assault with intent to murder), 265 sec. 24 (assault with intent
to rape), 265 sec. 29 (assault with intent to commit a felony); Omo
GEN. CODE (1939) sec. 12421 (assault with intent to kill, rape, rob);
TEXAS STAT. (Vernon, 1936) Art. 1160 (assault with intent to mur-
der), Art. 1162 (assault with intent to rape), Art. 1163 (assault with
intent to rob).
'- MAY, CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed. 1938) sec. 160: ".... it might be
punished more severely where the punishment was within the dis-
cretion of the court or jury." Cornelison v. Commonwealth, 84 Ky.
583, 597, 2 S. W. 235, 238 (1886) ("There are no degrees of the offense
of assault and battery, except that in imposing the punishment the
circumstances of the one case demand a greater punishment than the
other. A mere assault is not as high an offense against the law as
when accompanied with a battery, and an assault and battery, with
the intent to rob or murder, is a more aggravated assault than a
mere assault and battery, and it may be said in this way that there
are degrees of the offense. The punishment is graded by the enor-
mity of the offense."). But see Hall v. State, 9 Fla. 203 (1860) and
Levi Wilson v. The People, 24 Mich. 410 (1872) (both holding that
assault with intent to kill was no different at common law than the
simple criminal assault).
1h HALL AND GLUECK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW
(1940) p. 66, Note on Aggravated Assault.
-Se6 supra note 16, also: GEN. STAT. CONN. (1930) sec. 6195
(assault with any deadly or dangerous weapon); ILL. REV. STAT.
STUDENT NOTES
intent to commit some felony, as well as actual ability to carry
mut that intent, are made essential elements of the offense. 20
The question is now raised, are all criminal assaults in fact
ag,,ravated assaults? There evidently is no crime which is de-
fined as an assault with intent to commit a battery. If there
were su-li a crime it would undoubtedly be classified as an ag-
,-ravated assault. It is conceivable that there might be such an
intent in the mind of an assaulter, who might wish to do an act
which is more severe than a simple civil assault and yet is not
as severe, for instance, as an assault with intent to kill. Let us
suppose that X intends to hit Y over the head with a club, but is
prevented from doing so by the intervention of Z. X would be
-uilty of an aggravated assault (assault with intent to commit
a battery), and this offense is more severe than if X had raised
the same club only for the purpose of putting fear of bodily
harm into the mind of Y. These two offenses are certainly dis-
tiinguishable, and for this reason it would seem that all criminal
assaults are not necessarily aggravated assaults.
We now come to the question of whether all aggravated as-
saults are attempted batteries. The answer to this question is
probably "no." While many aggravated assaults are undoubt-
edly attempted batteries, an assault with intent to rob, for in-
stance, need not be committed with any intent to do bodily harm
to another.
However, in spite of this reasoning, the fact remains that
the definition given and approved by the great majority of the
eourts and by their state statutes is, in effect, that of an at-
tempted battery, and that there could and probably should be
another crime, that of the simple criminal assault. This of-
fnse should be a crime which would stand alone on its own base,
with its own distinct elements, and should not be dependent
upon those elements which constitute the crimes of aggravated
assaults and attempted batteries.
It has been argued that the civil and criminal assaults
(1937) chap. 38, sec. 60 (assault with deadly weapon); OHIo GEN.
CODE (1939) sec. 12416 (assault with dangerous weapon); TEXAS
STAT. (Vernon, 1936) Art. 1147(8) (deadly weapons).
" COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935) chap. 48, sec. 67 (deadly weapon and
intent to commit bodily harm upon another); Ky. R. S. (1942) 433.150
(armed assault with intent to rob); GEN. LAWS MASS. (1932) 265,
sec. 18 (with dangerous weapon and intent to rob or murder).
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should have different definitions because they serve different
functions, that the tort was originated to give the plaintiff com-
pensation for damages, while the criminal offense was created
to protect society against a breach of the peace. " 1 This reasoning
does not appear to be sound. Is there not just as great a dis-
turbance of the peace by one who with only apparent ability to
carry out his threats creates a reasonable fear of bodily harm
in the minds of peaceful citizens as there is by one who does so
with the actual ability to carry out his threats? It would seem
that, whether you look at the situation objectively or subjec-
ively, the result as far as the peace of the community is con-
cerned is the same. 22 Both acts should be punished as criminal
offenses.
A word must be said here upon the provisions found in the
various state statutes concerning the definition of the criminal
assault. They are, apparently, neither consistent nor classifi-
able. Some statutes give no definition of the simple criminal
assault.2' 3  A few define it in terms similar to the common law
concept,2 4 while a few others have drawn up elaborate provisions
dividing the crime into first, second, and third degree cate-
gories.25  The language used in these statutes varies greatly.
However, it must be noted that regardless of this fact the courts
have used, on the whole, only two definitions, that of the at-
tempted battery, and the separate and distinct simple civil
assault.
There are two final questions to be raised. First, should the
test of apprehension be objectively or subjectively applied?
Second, if we make no fundamental distinction between a simple
civil assault and a simple criminal assault how are we to dis-
tinguish them?
Answering the first question, it seems sound to hold that the
test probably should be objectively applied; that is, would a
2 Note (1938) 11 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 104; Note (1909) 57 U. oF
PA. L. REV. 249.
-Burgess v. Commonwealth, supra note 1.
Conn., Kan., Mass., Ohio, Pa., Va.
" While REV. STAT. ME. (1930) 129, sec. 27 makes the require-
ment of present ability, its courts have held that their statute is
declaratory of the common law; State v. Mahoney, 122 Me. 483, 120
Atl. 543 (1923); State v. Creigton, 98 Me. 424, 57 Atl. 592 (1904).
2REV. CODES MONT. (1935) secs. 10976, 10977, 10978; N. Y.
PENAL LAW (1939) secs. 240, 242, 244.
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reasonable man under all of the circumstances have been put in
apprehension and fear of serious bodily harm? Apparently in
the civil assault the test for apprehension is objective.2 6 How-
"ver, the plaintiff must be aware of the act of the assaulter or
there is no liability upon the part of the actor, although the




Even though the plaintiff is too courageous to be frightened he is
itot deprived of his action against the actor, but if he is extremely
timid the courts ha-e been reluctant to protect him. However,
they may protect a timid person if it is specifically found that
the actor knew of this characteristic and took advantage of it.28
As given in the Restatemnent of Torts the test for apprehension
is whether the plaintiff reasonably believes "that the act [of the
assaulter] may result in immediate contact unless prevented
from so resulting by . . . [his, the plaintiff's own] self-defensive
action or by his flight or by the intervention of some outside
force.""-' However, even though one of these elements prevents
the bodily touching, and the plaintiff knew that it probably
would, the assault has been completed. 30  All of this amounts to
no more than saying that, with the exception of the assaulter
who takes advantage of the timid person, the test for apprehen-
sion in civil assault cases is probably objective. With like rea-
sniilg it would seem that the test of apprehension in criminal
cases could be applied in the same manner.3 '
The second question as to the distinction between the civil
and criminal assaults is more difficult. If there are certain
offenses for which an action will lie both civilly and criminally, 3 2
there is no absolute necessity to distinguish between the criminal
"PROSSER, TORTS (1941) sec. 10.
Idenm.
"'RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) sec. 27.
-'RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) sec. 24.
'RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) sec. 24, comment b.
" See, however, Nelson v. State, 42 Ohio App. 252, 181 N. E. 448
(1932) (which apparently applies the subjective test for apprehen-
sion).
" The writer queries whether there are not companion offenses
in civil and criminal law. Is not the intentional battery one of
these and false imprisonment another? For a discussion of the rela-
tion between crimes and torts see Jerome Hall, Interrelations of Cri-
minal Law and Torts (1943) 43 COL. L. REv. 753, concluded at 967;
see especially at 975.
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and civil assault, unless, perhaps, there is al action for a negli-
gent civil assault3 3 while there is, or should be, none criminally.34
In conclusion, the writer believes that the civil and the
criminal assaults are very closely allied ;35 that the test for ap-
prehension in both instances should probably be objective; that
the minority rule that one who causes apprehension with only
apparent present ability to carry out his threats is just as guilty
of a criminal assault as the actor who has the actual ability to
carry out his threats is the better rule; and that the offense whivh
the great majority of the courts are calling and punishing as a
criminal assault is in effect an attempted battery, which is. and
probably should be punished as. a distinct and separate criminal
offense.
A,-NNE F. NOYEs
'Note (1942) 31 Ky. L. J. 87.
"4Note (1942) 30 Ky. L. J. 421.
' The writer here queries whether the distinction between the
two offenses, if there is one, is not one of degree. Are, or must,
criminal offenses be more severe than civil offenses? Must there
necessarily be a distinction between civil and criminal offenses? In
this connection see also, note 32, supra.
An analogy to the negligent battery in civil and criminal law
is perhaps applicable. It would seem that the main distinction be-
tween these two offenses is almost wholly a matter of degree, all
negligent crimes requiring a higher degree of negligence than corre-
sponding civil offenses. For negligent civil and criminal batteries,
see, respectively, Note (1942) 31 Ky. L. J. 75, and Note (1942) 30
Ky. L. J. 418. In considering whether there may also be negligent
civil and criminal assaults, see supra, notes 32 and 33, especially 30
Ky. L. 3. 421, 422, footnote 8.
